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Features of Information Perception Via Mass Media for Identification of Threats and Risks

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ABSTRACT

Today, the social impact on the processes taking place in the economical space becomes not only an indirect but also an immediate influence factor demanding a more profound account when making prognostic analyses. Based on the theory of prospects by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, the work investigates the features of perceiving information from the Internet sources when managing risks.

The authors propose and substantiate a criterion of veracity as a counterbalance to unreliable information perceived; the criterion is based on the general coherence and connectivity of facts and judgments in the thinking of an individual. The problems of information perception for the purposes of assessing the phenomena and processes of the environment and managerial decision making are identified. It is shown that most of the cultural world-outlook concepts of individuals are very "tenacious" by their nature and remain resistant to changes even under the most favorable circumstances.

KEYWORDS: Veracity and falsity of information, consistency coherence and connectivity of information, heuristic assessment of information, cognitive stereotypes of information assessment, information content, information policy.

INTRODUCTION

Within the financial and economic space of both supranational and national levels, the recent decade is characterized by many previously seen and new events and manifestations. Among the habitual ones – the market volatility of various scales, cyclicity of social-economic processes of various scales, instability and turbulence (inconsistence of the gradients of change rates and phases) of economic development at all levels - from mega- to micro organizations. The increasing scale and growth of the global and regional interconnections enhanced the influence of these factors on the probable occurrence of risk events, threatening with significant losses and the national and regional economic safety in general. Alongside with numerous statistical indicators characterizing the overall instability of the social-economic environment, an indirect evidence of the above situation is a certain confusion of the financial and economic analysts due to the failures of prognostic models, as they are constantly requested by investment banks and institutions about short- and long-term prognoses. To find a solution and comply with the problems to be solved taking into account a certain agiotage activity in a number of market segments, methodologists elaborate new techniques to estimate the risk probability of financial tools, the changing value of assets, the probable outcomes of risk events and the possible forecasts at various horizons of analysis. These new methods include account of additional factors, seldom or not at all taken into account before. Today, these include the impact of social networks and the account of a non-professional market segment (Bezdenezhnykh, 2016; Bezdenezhnykh and Sinyavskiy, 2018). One may also agree with the authors of the work "Financial analytics loses topicality when a crowd rules the market", who give the following example: "... just a few days after N. N. Taleb, the author of extremely popular works "The Black Swan" and "Fooled by Randomness" wrote in Twitter that bitcoin was captured by 'sociopaths denying Covid' and that he was going out of the deal, the price of this cryptocurrency did not fall but rose up to a maximum of \$50,000. Assumingly, it was the social opinion that changed the analysts' forecast" (Profinance.ru by the materials of Bloomberg Market Snapshot Agency – News of ProFinance. Ru of 18.02.2021).

On the one hand, risk analysts realize that their work is not as demanded and useful as it used to be; on the other hand – the market needs a more correct and reliable analytical information.

Today, the risks for serious analysis are especially high, while the experts' performance becomes less and less effective and reliable (Bezdenezhnykh et al, 2020). Under the surging wave of changing technological modes, new investment scenarios related to the global currencies crisis and occurrence of a new crypto currency, development of such consumer technologies as electric transport, new medications, the demand for

which was enhanced by the Covid-19 pandemic, information technologies in communication, distant dispatching of goods and services and other new social-economic phenomena, the analytical account should include new unconventional assessment and threshold indicators alongside with the fundamental ones. Thus, the social impact on the processes within economic space becomes not only an indirect but also an immediate factor of influence, requiring a deeper account when building predictive analyses.

Here is one more example of vast practice. A producer of electric vehicles NIO Inc. (PRC) and a digital application for food delivery Meituan were actively developing programs to attract more and more new investors. So far the Chinese manufacturer has sold a relatively small amount of cars, about 80,000, but the company capitalization reached a rather substantial sum of \$93 bln. The Meituan market value is even higher, reaching \$337 bln¹. Both companies occupy the leading positions in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, while their shares became mandatory for mutual funds and ETF in developing markets. Following this market impact of the demand according to Bloomberg, analysts set the target price for the Chinese car producer to be \$65.07 which is about 40% higher than the fair value at the end of 2020 and 9.9% higher than the market price of capitalization. The same is true for the average target price of Meituan. However, this is only a part of the story. In the current report of 28.01.2021, the Morgan Stanley analysts assessed NIO even higher, at as much as \$80 per a share, claiming that the electric vehicle producers are drastically changing the commercial-productive model from mere selling to acquiring "high margins from software and services". The software model declared by this company is aimed at social demands for a client's comfort and conveniences. The company capitalization used to be assessed by the car sales indicators. Today, a producer and a software developer in one are assessed higher and cost much more. In this example, the Morgan Stanley analysts estimate the long-term automobile business of NIO company 30 times higher than the price/earnings ratio; its operations with software are estimated 52 times higher than the price/sales ratio. As a result, this part of NIO operations may constitute about one fifth of the complete capitalization of the company, although its sales constitute only 2% (Profinance.ru by the materials of Bloomberg Market Snapshot Agency - News of Pro Finance. Ru of 18.02.2021).

At the same time, these methods do not take into account the results of the impact of the social component on the market, which may change the focuses and vectors of attention rapidly and incalculably. The reasons for such changes are often hard to study, analyze, or estimate. The aim of this article is to research the features of social perception of information

1 The Meituan Select platform was launched in July 2020. The analysts from HSBC Holdings PLC, Citigroup Inc and Goldman Sachs Group Inc believe that even now Meituan Select constitutes 20% of the HSBC correct estimation of Meituan, for which the bank stated the record goal of 550 Hong Kong dollars.

through the Internet channels during identification of threats and risks in the activity of organizations. The study of such features does not solve all the issues associated with the reaction of the society to information in the Internet. However, in our opinion, it is an essential part of solving the overall task of forming an informational base for providing economic safety of organizations based on the estimation of various risk outcomes.

Stemming from the set objective, it is planned to research the following analytical tasks:

- 1. to consider the features of perception of significant information via the Internet by various population groups.
- 2. to analyze the principles of forming an informational base by various population groups as consumers of goods and services.
- 3. to assess the features influencing the quality of information and the possibilities for accounting them (if needed), and to substantiate proposals and ways to further estimate the factors of risk events formation and their consequences to ensure economic safety of organizations.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

Stemming from the first analytical task posed above, at the first stage of research we study the issue of correctness, veracity, reliability, falsity and fairness of information perception by various categories of users in methodological aspect. This issue has been studied from different sides in many works - juridical, politological, sociological, economic, philosophical, individual and group, logical and empirical, etc. In the analysis below we use some conclusions of the general methodological approach by an English philosopher B. Russell, who wrote: "To define 'truth' and 'lie', we need to describe the fact which makes the given belief veritable and the description must refer to nothing if that belief is false" (Russell, 1957, pp. 187-191). Developing this approach, he stated: "... trying to find out the nature of truth, it is necessary to observe three conditions with which every theory must comply" (Russell, 2000, pp. 245-246). These conditions can be reduced to the following methodological provisions:

First, the theory of veracity must imply its opposite – the falsity as a notion. Thus, a dual pair is formed: veracity and falsehood as mutually connected but opposed concepts.

Second, if there were no evaluative moral convictions (beliefs), there would have been neither falsehood nor veracity – in the sense that veracity is correlative to its opposite – falsehood. Actually, veracity and falsehood are the properties of convictions and statements; that is why the material world without conscience cannot include veracity and falsehood, as it does not contain any convictions or statements. In this aspect, the notion of veracity as a certain conventional notion is analogous to the notion of risk, which also cannot exist in the material world without a human factor.

Third, finally, veracity and falsehood of convictions always depends on something beyond the convictions. Thus,

although veracity and falsehood are properties of opinions, these properties depend on the relation of the opinions to other things, not on some property inherent in the opinions.

We will specially consider a frequently arising terminological issue of correlation between the notions "veracity" and "truth". Although they are very close in meaning, in the Russian language there are semantic differences in their definitions, as well as certain philosophical interpretations and conventions. The notions "veracity" and "truth" are separate in their meaning. According to the most popular version, the notion of "veracity" is interpreted as suprapersonal and even sacral phenomenon, while the notion of "truth" is closer to personal convictions of an individual, characterizing his or her sincerity. In philosophical dictionaries, the notion of "truth" is terminologically defined as a moral "commandment", "pledge", "vow", or "rule". People often try to "clarify", correct, or even contest truth as a social criterion of the value of information. In this sense, they speak of the differences in understanding truth by each individual (as the saying goes, "everyone has their own truth"). At that, interpreters of the "truthful information" rely on their personal (subjective) convictions. However, veracity as a notion is a more stable, more indisputable measure of information evaluation, but only in case of the established, agreed interconnection of the evaluated informational events and phenomena (for more detail see discussion at FB.ru: https://fb.ru/article/177879/pravdaeto-mnojestvennoe-ponyatie-ved-u-kajdogo-ona-svoya). Nevertheless, concluding the discussion of the content of these definitions, it should be noted that these concepts are generally conventional; they are agreed upon at the beginning of a discussion and further analysis is performed on the basis of their preliminarily accepted terminological interpretation.

An integrity of the above provisions draws us to a conclusion that methodologically veracity, as a category reflecting the social nature of relations, is the well-known logic of systemic comprehension by the individuals of a correlation between opinions and facts based on the accepted in the society (and in particular social strata) and personal criteria and information estimations. In practice, it can be difficult to identify the kind of such summarizing correlation, capable of explaining all (or at least most of) the internal conflicts and objections. This leads us to substantiation of the methodological interpretation that veracity as an informational model of the human estimation and behavior consists in the general correlation and connectivity of facts and judgments (opinions) in the thinking of an individual. One may also formulate the definition ex adverso: a sign of falsehood as a model of behavior estimation is its inability to connect the opinions of individuals into one unit and the essence of veracity is that it can be a part of a complete system of correlation between opinions and facts of definite apprehended veritable information.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The above definition allows drawing a distinction between

what is veritable and what is false, provided one can build a systemic informational connection between events, facts, and opinions. However, such a general definition causes a number of questions requiring special discussion and regulation.

The first problem: one may not be confident that only a single systemic set and informational connection of agreed opinions is possible. When such a systemic set of estimations is formed, there may be two or more source hypotheses, selecting and grouping events and facts on a certain topic. In such cases one tries to find facts contradicting to all hypotheses but one, but one cannot think that it is always possible.

One should also take into account the phenomenon of the probable forming of cognitive dissonance, actively discussed in the 1950-60s. The cognitive dissonance theory was proposed by L. Festinger. In the 1980-90s, the phenomenon was explained in the works by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky. The essence of this approach is that a conflict develops in conscience between convictions/assumptions of the individual and the reality perceived. To avoid an inner conflict, the conscience eliminates these contradictions by "amending" the perceived facts. For example, an investor was late to make the necessary decision and did not get the profit; to justify it, he or she attempts to explain the failure by not getting the necessary information in time, although he or she had never used this information before.

Another problem for discussion within this topic is also related to the forming initial hypotheses. There may occur situations when two competing hypotheses are able (or seem to be able) to form judgments taking into account all the events and facts under study. That is, one may say that the notion of consistency as a definition of veracity does not comprehensively explain the phenomenon of "veracity", as it is impossible to prove that there may exist only one consistent system (James, 2000; Russell, 2000, pp. 245-246). It is possible that a false informational model exists alongside with the veritable one. This can be illustrated by a vivid and rather broadly discussed example called "The Massachusetts experiment" (for more details see: https://s-t-o-l.com/ gosudarstvo-i-chelovek/tehnologiya-lzhi-massachusetskijeksperiment/). It shows how easily suggestible most people are. Usually, the overall pattern of the informational impact is the following: a fake interview is published in a socially-oriented web-site or mass media, then opinions of some scholars (often little known and low qualified) are mentioned, then opinions of public figures popular with the focus groups (often with low social responsibility). Many unprepared people consider this information to be highly authoritative, hence, veritable, and they are eager to support it the more vigorously, the more significant the topic of the initial interview was. That was the case with the story of a fake doctor James Rogers, which can be called a mystification or an illustration of the technique of lying taking place in the Internet in 2013. A letter of the fake doctor was published in The Massachusetts Daily Collegian. Remarkable are the concluding words from that letter: ".... Thus, it does not

matter what ghosts you inhabit your world with. As long as you believe in them, they exit; as long as you do not fight them, they are not dangerous" (https://s-t-o-l.com/gosudarstvo-i-chelovek/tehnologiya-lzhi-massachusetskij-eksperiment/).

That is exactly how many swindlers acted and continue to act, building false connections between events and phenomena and forming false concepts, for example, when building financial pyramids like MMM, Vlastelina, and others. That is exactly how the policy of informational content of the "virtual world" is elaborated and implemented in some countries and even international organizations, as we will show below.

We may draw some conclusions of the discussion of the interpretation of the social phenomena of human perception and comprehension of the information about the surrounding world, its processes and probable regularities. The correctness of assessment of the source information determines the whole chain of further managerial actions, resulting in making and implementing a decision under a complex and unstable situation.

The correctness of assessment also determines the subsequent probability estimations of risks when implementing the actual or planned actions. Reliability or veracity as a counterbalance to the unreliable perceived information can be based on the proposed criterion of general coherence and connectivity of facts and judgments (opinions) in the logical deductions of an individual. Establishing such connectivity helps to assess the reliability of informational veracity of observations and conclusions stemming from them. The reverse is also true.

The additional sign characterizing veracity and falsehood is the absence of the revealed coherence of the observed phenomena. Also, it should be noted that the conscience of an individual forms such coherence on the basis of accumulated competences, skills, professional knowledge, social experience, taking into account the social-economic context and emotional background. All those factors influence the logic of thinking and deductions of an individual and should be taken into account when considering their behavior (Bezdenezhnykh, 2017).

Further we consider the second research problem; we study the features of individual perception and assessment of information which are important for establishing its veracity, as was shown above. It appears that the errors of individual perception are not accidental but expectable. They demonstrate imperfection of a human being, complemented by specific features of perception and comprehension of the already distorted information, as was shown in this article; thus, wrong estimations are formed, which lead to equally wrongful decisions.

These issues were first discussed in the above-mentioned works by L. Festinger, D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, and others (Kahneman et al., 2005). They research the motives and psychology of human estimation errors, which often occur due to a hasty or far from objective estimation. At

first glance, errors occur even in obvious situations due to insufficient information, and their cost appears to be high. However, situations are not always obvious, which is due to both the objective incompleteness of information and the subjective limitation of the observation subject's capability to analyze information. The reasons for that and the possible solutions were described by an Economics Nobel laureate D. Kahneman in the work "Thinking, Fast and Slow" (Belyanin, 2003). Without repeating the main provisions of the "theory of prospects" model by D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, we will draw attention to some important aspects. First of all, we highlight such a strict condition as the availability of always limited volume of information to be analyzed, as well as the environment uncertainty factor, which does not allow an individual to make a more accurate and effective decision.

Then, we should highlight the previously discussed need to establish the criterion of information veracity, which is determined by now closely various facts, phenomena, and events are connected and how they are built into a single connected informational system. Most of the questions consist in establishing a number of estimations, for example, what the probability is that the observed object belongs to a certain type (class, group, etc.). There may be a question of establishing causes and consequences, i.e. what the probability is that the observed event is caused by certain processes or that the observed processes will result in a certain event. Under the lack of accurate enough information, a subject relies on indirect data and samples preceding probability. Such "heuristic" approach, often applied in practice, is often and even always not optimal and insufficient for solving practical managerial tasks. "Heuristic" techniques and information estimation algorithms rely on certain features of human perception of information and decision making based on estimation of probable events. Despite their limitation, they allow, on the basis of formed stereotypes, simplifying (thus, accelerating) the process of estimating and decision making under uncertainty, when searching for an optimal decision is too costly (in time or other resources) or problematic. As a rule, forming a stereotype response, a subject relies on their intuition and the formed opinion of a certain community (social strata) and is not eager to part with the habitual programs of information estimation. This can be proved by the words of an English philosopher and economist John Kenneth Galbraith (2009): "Faced with the choice between changing one's mind and proving that there is no need to do so, almost everyone gets busy on the proof". Ultimately, the factors confirming the initial theory are attributed a higher weight than those causing doubts in it, J. K. Galbraith explained.

There is one also another cause of possible errors of information perception and estimation. Many errors are associated with determining the so called representative sample for analysis. Mathematical statistical rules for assessing the sample probability are not fit for estimating performance risks as probable event leading to declination from the goal of management. The features of interpreting

"probability" as a mathematical term and "possibility" as evaluative term are discussed in a special clause of the ISO/IEC 31000:2018 "Risk management". The difficulties in forming and assessing a sample of event is confirmed by practical consultants when speaking about the features of determining an ensemble probability, qualitative differences in statistical estimation of risks in multiple or unique events. Due to the practice of such "heuristic", intuitively cautious methods, the estimations of subsequent outcomes were diminished, they were considered less significant than they actually were. D. Kahneman called this phenomenon of cautious estimation of risks "conservatism". Another example of heuristic estimation, by D. Kahneman, is the occurrence of an evaluative "illusion of control" as a result of people's predisposition to see regularities where there are none. One more example of a heuristic (actually, erroneous) acceptance of an increased risk on profit ("house money effect"); this effect is manifested in economically irrational behavior of investors: they are apt to take more risks with the profit already obtained from an investment. Another example is declination of estimation due to "diversification" (diversification bias, diversification/choice heuristic). There are other examples of heuristics by the above authors.

These and other features of individual information estimation were researched in numerous works, thus there is no need to describe them in detail. Taking into account the key objectives of this article, we can formulate some results of the review.

Confidence in such "objective", in an individual's opinion, observations and heuristic, as well as using the established evaluative "cognitive stereotypes" is inherent in people not only at everyday level. Qualified researchers and experts share the same "intuitive bias" (by D. Kahneman) or make mistakes relying on such heuristic estimations. Usually, the experts wielding statistical methods make fewer mistakes, but the general rule is that an individual makes decisions on the basis of established interconnections of facts and events, thinking that they behave rationally; the identified subjective features show that they act irrationally both for the goals of management and for the subject of management per se. This is especially vividly manifested in analysis and intuitive judgments under complex, intricate or new and non-standard situations characterized by a high level of context uncertainty (Bezdenezhnykh, 2017).

It is important to understand why such crude methods are still being used and how such intuitive subjectively inaccurate methods can be useful. There are several reasons why one may agree with the conclusion of behavioral economics theoreticians that the analysis of intuitive decisions based cognitive stereotypes is useful.

The first reason is because it views a subjective probability as a quantitative estimation of a statistically average individual facing the task of choosing a decision in a relatively standard situation. In such a situation a relatively integral estimation as

a subjective probability provided the analysis of the proposed odds conforms to certain methodological principles. The established estimation is by all means subjective in its nature, as the individuals may have different measurements of the probability of one and the same informational event.

Second, the methodological conception of the approach consists in interpreting the probability estimation applied to unique, not serial events. As a whole, such an approach to using the subjective-irrational opinion usefully supplements the theory of rational decision making, while having one limitation. This criterion, with the apparent logic of probability estimation (for example, with the method of iteration or successive approximation), can be used only as an additional one, because the internally consistent set of subjective probabilities can be incompatible with other internal attitudes and conceptions inherent in the given individual. These reasons are generally associated with significant deviations and errors occurring in forecasts of various analysts, leading to rejection of their recommendations.

Thus, we distinguish two serious problems of information perception for the purposes of estimating the external phenomena and processes and making managerial decisions.

First, a differing understanding and perception of the same phenomena and events as veritable or, at least, just.

Second, estimating of the same events with various methods, establishing different criteria and threshold values and forecast scenarios.

Combination of these problems poses the question of the possibility to assess information for the management goals, first of all, strategic and providing safety. More specifically, it is the question of elaborating and using the methods allowing to somewhat reduce the difficulties of individual perception and estimation of information.

First of all, let us consider several examples illustrating the features of information perception when making managerial decisions. These examples show the practical results of the above mentioned features of information perception by individuals and groups and social institutions. Today, the most topical is the analysis of perception of information about the spreading of Covid-19 pandemic at the local, regional and global levels, and the use of this information to prevent spreading of the disease and maintain the economic and social stability in the society. Periodical waves of the disease spreading and human losses show that neither the academic and expert community, nor the healthcare sphere, nor the pharmaceutical sector, nor general economy, or social sphere achieved fully satisfactory results in organization and management of complex social-economic systems, which is due not only to a competitive opposition, but also, in our opinion, due to the differences in the perception of information about the causes of occurrence, spreading and features of prophylaxis of Covid-19. These features of information estimation vividly demonstrate the greatly varying practices of the pandemic counteraction organization in different countries around the world. It can hardly be assumed that many persons and organizations responsible for this work purchase their own interests, trying to use the crisis situation to achieve their pragmatic goals, personal or group interests. The reasons for their misconceptions are associated with their understanding of the veracity of certain information, building a system of connections between facts in compliance with their convictions and criteria. The peculiarity of such perception consists in selective perception of information on the basis of tuning the personal selection filters according to individual criteria and properties. These features lead to differences in estimation and making managerial decisions on that basis. The said features are manifested not only in the analysis of information about the corona virus, but also in other spheres of perception and estimation of socialeconomic information. This is especially true under the increased opposition, actually confrontation, between the western viewpoint at the problem of information content and the opinion of different countries, including Russia. To accurately and competently select the reliable information it is necessary to understand the format of organization of the objective, positive and comprehensive system of information cooperation development. The keynote thesis, reflecting the position of the western countries in information estimation, is the US President D. Trump's speech on September 23, 2020 at the U.N.O. General Assembly, in which he emphasized, first of all, the focus of the perceived information towards national interests which are a priority in decision making and a guarantee of development of every country. A different position about the accounting of the information content during decision making was reflected in the Russian President V.V. Putin's speech at the same forum, consisting in the weighed perception of information to build balance and harmony between national and global interests as a guarantee of successful strategic development of each country and all countries as a whole. The initially differing models of the information content perception form the logic of interconnections when perceiving information and making managerial decisions.

The traditional question is what should be done to amend the actual contradiction. The said difference in understanding veracity, righteousness and justice in estimating certain events, phenomena and situations leads to tensions in relations at all levels: at the levels of individuals, organizations and states, as well as to difficulties in solving the issues of the necessary interaction with a view of safety of all participants. This can be illustrated by the example of activity of the Global Engagement Center under the US administration, which is entitled according to its statute, to counteract propaganda threats in informational space. This organization analyzes information and arranges its work stemming from establishing interactions between informational events and phenomena based on heuristic

vision set by the US administration and the experts, taking into account all the above listed features of information perception and estimation. Other organizations and countries perform analysis based on different models of information perception; their work is arranged so that to perceive and create conditions for obtaining access to the information content, taking into account not only certain partner and group interests of governments and countries, but strategic balances for all stakeholders: countries, business, civic organizations, academic circles, mass media and press. The aim thereof is for the national and international community to be able to carry out a truly balanced analysis of factual data, thus increasing collective resistance to disinformation and fake propaganda. So far, there is little evidence of convergence in the sphere of information interaction under increasing uncertainty both among global institutions and on bilateral basis. Researches mark the growing reinforcement of the redoubts of informational opposition, which are being built and filled with content along the following main

- official (government) messages,
- global messages of information agencies financed by the state,
- cultivated proxy sources (distant computer intermediary for the user to access the Internet),
- "weaponization" (turning information into a weapon destroying social links) of social networks, and, last but not least,
- cyber disinformation.

Further development of counteraction against the information manipulation is based on elaborating analytical tools for monitoring various threats and elaborating policies and procedures enabling to take countermeasures. However, while these efforts are made, a false opinion can be formed, due to the above listed reasons, about the increased awareness of a threat created by disinformation, and subsequent development of an international dialogue between the states, organizations and persons committed to counteraction against such malevolent or just unreasoned efforts. In the 1970s, such distorted perception of the informational field was not conductive for the popular convergence model, i.e. mutual approaching of the countries with various cultural-historical traditions and practices.

From every sign, confrontation in the mass media informational field is not reducing, especially for the category of persons and structures whose world outlook and moral values ladder are of more radical or even extremist character. An example is the statement by lieutenant colonel Jyri Raitasalo, a specialist in military strategy and safety of National Defence University (Finland): "According to a viewpoint prevailing in the West, after annexing the Crimea in 2014, Russia made the western communities and states a target of its fake news and other manifestations of

'weaponized', i.e. turned into a weapon, information. This is undoubtedly so, but such a view of the West at Russia only partially touches upon the real problem existing in the sphere of defense (apparently, for the West – authors). Inadequately identifying the threat, many western states elaborate erroneous countermeasures in response to the challenge posed by Russia" (Raitasalo, n.d.). Such estimation and transition of the discussion to the military sphere becomes dangerous, putting the relations of the states at the verge of ensuring the countries' safe development.

The provisions and conclusions presented in the first part of the work show that it is impossible to make people easily change their viewpoint in those issues which are rooted deeply in their identity and multiple national narratives. Moreover, narratives are collective social facts and experiences going beyond the separate people' opinions. Most of the cultural concepts of individuals are very "tenacious" by their nature and they remain steady against changes even under the most favorable conditions. But the reason people want to believe in this or that fact is not so much because they consider it veritable or true, but because it complies with their world outlook.

That leads to another global (not at all Russian) problem associated with the narrative formed around fake news. Heads and political centers of many western states, perceiving information heuristically, do not identify and ignore some of the problems existing at their own internal level. The narrative formed around fake news is deceptive, as it offers a seemingly simple (actually, simplified) solution for a complex and multilevel economic and social problem. Many people in different countries (from large ones like the USA, Germany, France to smaller ones like Abkhazia, Armenia, Belarus and other) stick to the positions aimed against the actions of the government and establishment, because they perceive being excluded from the politically active society or deprived from the process of making social-economic and political decisions. A protest against the mainstream becomes a way to express their ideas and identity. Even a brief review shows that the distorted perception of information as the source base for decision making leads to a system of erroneous measures and actions, not facilitating the solving of specific economic and social problems or provision of safety at all levels - from mega- to micro-level.

The best policy of struggling against fake news and information war implies creating a society in which all socially significant groups feel they are a part of it. It is impossible to create an ideal society, just as anything ideal, but striving towards a society balanced in interests should be a priority task of development. The citizens who do not perceive the message to administrative protest in the informational impulses cannot be persuaded to support the policy which destroys the bases of safety of the society or a state. Many countries which are boiling with social protests today will

need a lot of time to reach the level of informational content comprehensively and adequately perceived by individuals and organizations, even if they start building the modern information policy and acting right now.

CONCLUSION

The analysis showed that today the social impact on the processes taking place in the economical and political space becomes not only an indirect but also an immediate influence factor demanding a more profound account when making prognostic analyses. The authors proposed and substantiated a criterion of veracity of the perceived information as a counterbalance to unreliable and false information; the criterion is based on the general coherence and connectivity of facts and judgments (opinions) in the perception of an individual. Establishing such connectivity helps to assess the reliability of observations and conclusions stemming from them. The article reveals two problems of information perception for the purposes of assessing the phenomena and processes of the environment and making managerial decisions. The first one is the differing understanding and perception of the same phenomena and events as veritable or, at least, just. The second is assessing the same events with different methods, establishing different criteria, threshold values and prognostic scenarios. Combination of these problems poses the question of the possibility to assess information for the purposes of management, first of all, strategic and safety purposes, and, in particular, the methods to neutralize the difficulties of individual perception and assessment of information. Most of the cultural world-outlook concepts of individuals are very "tenacious" and remain steady against changes even under very favorable conditions. That is why the reason people want to believe a particular piece of information is not so much because they consider it veritable or true, but because it complies with their world outlook. These features of information perception should be taken into account when forming the mass media content in order to ensure sustainable development of economics and the society, when selecting the methods and criteria of estimating the risks and providing their safety.

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