

## A History of Online Privacy Rights

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### ABSTRACT

*This paper examines why individuals lack data privacy on the Internet, and it does so by exploring the ways in which constitutional and statute law fail to provide adequate privacy protections—even when rights to privacy are intended. As the author argues, there are three main reasons for the scarcity of Internet data privacy: first, the law lacks a sufficient definition of data privacy. Second, existing laws and statutes regarding the right to data privacy have inherent flaws and loopholes. Third, the modern era of web design is inconvenient for users and leads to an unfair engagement of contracts, which in turn, gives users little choice but to expose their data to third parties.*

**KEYWORDS:** *Right to privacy, Right to data privacy, Information privacy, Consumer privacy, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, Search and Seizure, Katz v. United States, Olmstead v. United States, Privacy Act of 1974, Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Trade Commission, Facebook, Google, Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, General Data Protection Regulation, California Consumer Privacy Act*

The right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the United States Constitution as a guaranteed right of the people, as the Bill of Rights and other amendments have done such as with the freedom of speech or the right to bear arms. The closest clause suggesting a right to privacy appears in the Fourth Amendment. The right to privacy is still a fairly novel concept, as its first notable mention only appears in Samuel D. Warren II and Justice Louis Brandeis's "The Right to Privacy", a *Harvard Law Review* article published in 1890. In it, Warren and Brandeis advocate for a right to privacy, or more specifically, "the right to be left alone" (Warren & Brandeis, 1890).

In June 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the constitutionally guaranteed right to abortion care established in its 1973 decision *Roe v. Wade*. In the 2022 decision overturning *Roe*, *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, the right to reproductive rights is now decided among the states. However, the right to privacy does not extend only to reproductive rights; questions concerning the right to privacy also pervade the digital world. The internet is still less than thirty years old, as the inception of the World Wide Web by computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee began in 1989. Since then, the internet has seen an unprecedented era in the explosion of both social networking around the world and the sharing of convenient access to information technology. From 2000 to 2016, the World Wide Web has grown from 413 million global users to 3.4 billion (Murphy et al., 2018). At the same time, these developments have

allowed private technology companies and websites to gather information about individuals either unknowingly or without their consent. As early as 2001, "Web bugs" tracked the sites people visit and send the information to third-party marketing research and advertising companies, which, in turn, are now used on 18 percent of web pages (Schwartz, 2001). Another report found that it was possible for websites to make freely available individual voter's registration records along with their home addresses on the Internet (Harmon, 2001).

This paper examines why individuals lack data privacy on the Internet today. It pinpoints three main reasons for the scarcity of Internet data privacy: first, the law lacks a sufficient definition of data privacy. Second, existing laws and statutes regarding the right to data privacy have inherent flaws and loopholes. Third, the modern era of web design is inconvenient for users and leads to an unfair engagement of contracts, which in turn, gives users little choice but to expose their data to third parties.

The lack of a concrete definition of data privacy can lead to loose interpretations of any right to data privacy. In the event of a case challenged in the Supreme Court, one's right to personal information would likely not fall under Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Instead, as technology continues to develop over time, the Supreme Court would more likely favor security over privacy (Sergent, 1995). This is mainly because of the Fourth Amendment's particular phrasing—it only forbids "unreasonable searches and

seizures.” However, the words “seizure” and “searches” are loosely defined and have been set only by Supreme Court precedents.

The Supreme Court defined “seizure” as the interference “with anyone’s possessory interest in a meaningful way” in the 1984 *United States v. Karo* (*United States v. Karo*, 1984) case. The Court ruled that the Drug Enforcement Administration did not violate the right to privacy when it installed beepers inside cans to monitor respondents’ items because the can containing the beeper conveyed no private information pertaining Karo—it did not substantially interfere with anyone’s possessory interest.

The precedent was further upheld by the Court’s 1987 decision in *Arizona v. Hicks* (*Arizona v. Hicks*, 1987). The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that copying serial numbers from a stereo component did not constitute a seizure, as recording the numbers did not affect the respondent’s possession of the numbers or stereo equipment. This trend continued in *Bills v. Aseltine* (*Bills v. Aseltine*, 1992), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that taking photographs of a search scene was not a seizure.

Yet, one exception to the trend persists. In the 1967 *Katz v. United States* case (*Katz v. United States*, 1967), FBI agents wiretapped a petitioner’s telephone call and introduced the electronic listening and recording device attached outside the telephone booth in which Katz had made calls at a trial. Katz was convicted for transmitting wagering information by telephone across state lines, violating U.S. Code 18 Section 1084, which the Court of Appeals upheld and found no Fourth Amendment violation because the FBI did not physically enter the telephone booth. In response, the Supreme Court rejected the ruling, claiming that the government violated the petitioner’s right to privacy while using the telephone booth as the Fourth Amendment protects people rather than places and extends to recording oral statements.

As a result of these Supreme Court rulings, it is unlikely that copying a user’s computer files containing personal information would ever be protected under a court of law in the United States’ highest judicial body because possession of such files containing conversations or credentials would allow for one to control the use of information inside of it while possessing a physical item used to communicate such as a stereo would interfere with one’s use of the device. It is possible to search through one’s personal records and information without touching computer equipment at all. Thus, defendants may lack standing to challenge illegal searches of private information, as limited by the Supreme Court. Still, because personal data ultimately lies closer to a written document or oral conversation, it could be protected under the Fourth Amendment and its subsequent protections.

The definition of the word “search” in a Fourth Amendment context is even more difficult to define than “seizures.” In

fact, the Supreme Court has never given a comprehensive definition of what the word means under the Fourth Amendment at all (Erickson & LaFave, 1980). Instead, before 1967 and *Katz*, cases such as *Olmstead v. United States* (*Olmstead v. United States*, 1928) pointed towards an area-based definition of “search.”

In 1928, government officers secretly wiretapped a telephone line and intercepted a conversation between the accused, who had conspired to violate Prohibition. The use of this evidence in a federal court was deemed not a violation of the Fifth Amendment right to not self-incriminate, and the Supreme Court also ruled in *Olmstead* that because the tapping connections were made on public streets in a large office building’s basement and not on the property of the defendants, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment.

As mentioned above, *Katz* sharpened an individual’s expectation of privacy and focused it on individuals instead of certain areas. Justice John Harlan’s concurring opinion has since laid out the standard of a “search” under two conditions: first, that the individual exhibits an expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation of privacy is deemed reasonable by society (*Smith v. Maryland*, 1979 & *California v. Ciraolo*, 1986). Nevertheless, this standard of privacy remains uncertain and tenuous because the government can defeat it relatively easily. The definition of an expectation of privacy remains unclear and largely under this loose interpretation, and statute laws cannot completely or accurately account for the variety of ways an individual infers privacy. On the other hand, the government can announce its intentions of surveillance in advance and completely subvert these expectations.

Second, a “reasonable” expectation of privacy is just as subjective, as it merely reflects the extent to which a society honors a right to privacy, and the Supreme Court has interpreted this idea as whether or not an individual expects to be undisturbed, as seen in *Rakas v. Illinois* (*Rakas v. Illinois*, 1978). In *Rakas*, a 1978 decision, police stopped robbers who were leaving the scene of a crime and seized a box of rifle shells and a sawed-off rifle. Prosecutors admitted the items as evidence in an Illinois court to convict the robbery suspects. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that the defendants did not have Fourth Amendment rights because they failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car as passengers. However, this reasoning limits the defendants’ right to privacy by burdening them with proving their expectation of privacy; instead, the question of reasonableness ought to shift to the methods police use to investigate criminal suspects.

Because of these flaws in the current definition of the right to privacy, there is currently little use in applying the Fourth Amendment in the context of data privacy; individuals would either have the absolute right or none at all. It is also important to understand that the Fourteenth Amendment does not

protect data privacy either—the constitutionally protected “zone of privacy” is evident in two spheres: independence in making personal decisions and the independence to avoid disclosing personal matters. Justification of the constitutional right to privacy upheld by the 1965 *Griswold v. Connecticut* (*Griswold v. Connecticut*, 1965) case and *Roe v. Wade* (*Roe v. Wade*, 1973) using the Fourteenth Amendment only applies to the personal sphere, not the latter; the extent of one’s right to avoid disclosing personal matters has not yet been defined by the Supreme Court (Solove, 2006).

Aside from the vague definition of an expectation of privacy, current legislation has multitudes of inherent flaws, loopholes, and poor implementation, which leads to a failure of upholding the right to information privacy as intended. For example, in *Nixon v. Administrator of General Services* (*Nixon v. Administrator of General Services*, 1977), the Supreme Court in 1977 articulated a right to information privacy, yet never developed this concept further. Because of this, there is no authoritative definition of the right to information privacy; the Court leaves the matter up for debate to lower court jurisdictions.

The Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act, 1974) established regulations for the collection and use of records by the federal government, and individuals have the right to access and correct their personal information. This legislation did make a step in controlling government information systems, but it also has crucial shortcomings. One important problem with the act is that it does not apply to the private sector at all, and it does not apply to state or local governments either, only the federal government.

Furthermore, personal information may still be disclosed for a “routine use” exception, if doing so is considered “compatible” with an agency collecting the information’s purpose. This “routine use” exception effectively serves as a loophole that can be used to completely avoid obliging under the Privacy Act (Schwartz, 1995). While the Privacy Act of 1974 also attempted to restrict the use of Social Security Numbers (SSNs), these rules once again did not apply to the private sector. In the present-day world, SSNs are now used as a form of a password for individuals to access personal records at banks, schools, and hospitals.

Weaknesses in the federal regulation of one’s right to privacy only precede the widespread collection of Internet users’ personal information by private technology companies. One of the most straightforward reasons private technology companies can ignore consumer data privacy rights is simply because they illegally collect and share data from users.

In September 2019, Google agreed to pay a \$170 million settlement after the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the New York Attorney General filed a complaint that Google’s YouTube video-sharing service illegally collected information from children without consent from their parents (Federal Trade Commission, 2019). This was a violation of the 1998

Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 1998), which requires that child-directed websites and online services notify users of their information practices and privacy policies prior to collecting personal information for children under 13 years of age with parental consent. Such methods of identifiers include tracking a user’s Internet browsing habits to sell for targeted advertising and third-party advertising networks. YouTube had marketed itself as a top online destination for children yet had not complied with the necessary regulations.

Even though the \$170 million settlement was the largest sum of money gathered by the FTC by a COPPA case, Google’s parent company, Alphabet, earned a profit of \$30.7 billion off of \$136.8 billion in revenue collected from targeted advertising alone in 2018 (United States Securities and Exchange Commission, 2019). Thus, many lawmakers and children’s advocacy groups argue that the repercussions are extremely light for these private technology conglomerates.

One of the most famous incidents of the illegal sharing of data occurred in 2018 when an online leak found that Facebook, the world’s largest social media platform with approximately 3 billion monthly active users (DataReportal, 2022), had been providing the personal information of over 80 million profiles for the purpose of political advertising without users’ consent to Cambridge Analytica, a political consulting company connected to President Donald Trump (Kang, 2018). For the egregious breach of consumer data privacy rights, Facebook was punished with a \$5 billion penalty by the FTC; while this was the largest regulatory penalty imposed by the United States government on a company, many criticized the fine because it did not impose any meaningful change to the company’s structure or financial incentives, leading to no change in the underlying reason for the data scandal in the first place. Instead, some commissioners advocated for litigation against Facebook and Zuckerberg (Davies & Rushe, 2019). Years after the incident, Facebook remains a prominent company that still generates billions of dollars in revenue without many concrete restrictions, despite the magnitude of the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Monetary fines in response to consumer privacy data scandals will continue to receive backlash if structural changes are not implemented as well, which the United States government must be responsible for enacting on private technology companies.

In the status quo, there is no expectation of confidentiality or privacy online for Internet users due to the widespread tracking of online activity without permission. Thousands of websites use canvas fingerprinting, allowing them to track users’ activity on the Internet without informing them, and the usage of cookies also enables websites to track users’ activity and display targeted and invasive advertisements based on identified consumer preferences and can reveal sensitive information about the user. In addition, individuals



downloading mobile apps on their phones can grant mobile application companies access to a plethora of cell phone features and data (Identity Management Institute, 2019).

When private technology companies amass control of such large quantities of personal information, the databases are often subject to breaches or compromises. One of the most notable examples arose in the 2018 Marriott International hacking, in which hackers breached its Starwood reservation system and stole the personal data of up to 500 million of its customers (Perlroth et al., 2018). This breach affected customers who made reservations in subservient Starwood hotel brands from 2014 to 2018, including Sheraton, Westin, W Hotels, St. Regis, Four Points, Aloft, Le Méridien, Tribute, Design Hotels, Element, and the Luxury Collection. While the Residence Inn and Ritz-Carlton hotels operated on a separate reservation system, Marriott International had planned to merge those systems with Starwood, which would have put even more customers at risk of having their personal information exposed had it been done before the instance of the data breach. Stolen personal credentials included names, addresses, phone numbers, birth dates, email addresses, and encrypted credit card details, as well as travel histories and passport numbers for a smaller group of guests. Not only that, but the security breach went unnoticed for four years; it started in 2014 when a security tool alerted officials to an unauthorized attempt to access the guest reservation database, which also led to the discovery of a foothold gathered by hackers in Starwood's systems. Since the data breach, Marriott International has offered one year of free enrollment in Web Watcher, a service in the United States, Canada, and Britain that tracks websites where thieves exchange and sell personal information and alerts users if their information is being sold.

Even if only one private technology company unlawfully gathers the data of its customers, that personal information can be and is often compromised in the form of data breaches, which can spread the credentials far and wide across the Internet into the hands of malicious actors without any means of retrieving the data back to its source.

Modern web design practices continue to perpetuate a lack of data privacy among consumers, as all responsibility is left to them to control their own personal information when allowing private technology companies to do what they wish with it is the much more convenient option.

As current laws stand, private technology companies follow the "informed consent" model, a practice used in medical care and human subject research, where consumers encounter privacy notices and privacy policies online as they use the Internet (Kerry, 2018). However, because of the massive explosion in Internet usage since the inception of informed consent in the 1990s, informed consent—which would require consumers to read through privacy policies written in legalese from every single website they visit on the Internet is no longer practical. Because of this, a majority

of adult Americans today, or 97 percent polled by the Pew Research Center, have been asked to agree to privacy policies at least once when using the Internet, yet a very small minority of 22 percent of polled adult Americans always or often bother to read the entire fine print and only 13 percent understand what these policies entail (Pew Research Center, 2019). Along with these statistics comes the fact that only 21 percent of polled adult Americans are very or somewhat confident that private companies will publicly admit mistakes and take responsibility if they misuse or compromise users' personal data, suggesting little public confidence in private companies' accountability with their personal information.

Systematic changes can be made to remedy many of the issues present with current data privacy practices, such as the opt-in system. Removing long legal text that the average American would never read paves the way for a truly consensual individualized targeting of users (Zittrain, 2018). Secondly, providing individuals access to all the data a private company has gathered about them as well as how it uses the gathered data can provide an additional level of transparency (Frenkel, 2018). Third, specifically enumerating the timeframe in which collected data can be used can further empower consumers' control. Fourth, the aggregate use of data can be regulated. For example, if a private company were to gather health information on a billion customers, this can still create unforeseen threats to individuals and public harms (Tufekci, 2018).

Two existing pieces of legislation outline a potential solution to the lack of regulation of data privacy practices by private technology companies: the Obama administration's Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights and the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. Both texts outline a set of basic rights that consumers have on the Internet with regard to data privacy.

The Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights enumerates seven key protections for consumers: individual control, transparency, respect for context, security, access and accuracy, focused collection, and accountability (The White House, 2012). The bill requires the FTC to establish a set of rules regarding the collection of personal information in order to increase consumer privacy (Markey, 2019). Under the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, consumers have greater control over their personal information, as private technology companies that gather data must notify individuals of how their personal information is used in an easily understandable and accessible format, obtain express approval to use a consumer's personal information and provide the ability to withdraw that approval. The companies cannot deny service based on a refusal to approve the collection of their personal information nor can they offer price incentives in exchange for approval. The companies must ensure that depersonalized information cannot be restored to make an individual identifiable, and not disclose personal information to a third party under a written contract unless the contract prohibits

the third party from using the personal information for any other reason than performing the contracted service or disclosing the personal information to another third party.

Consumers also have the right to secure and responsible handling of their personal information; they can access, correct in case of inaccuracies, or delete personal data upon request. They also have a reasonable limit on the personal data that companies collect and retain, as well as appropriate measures to ensure that private technology companies will handle personal information while adhering to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights. Until the proposal of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, these specific data privacy rights were never enumerated before by laws or statutes in the United States.

In the European Union, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), put into effect on May 25, 2018, is a strict privacy and security law for people in the EU, which levies heavy fines of tens of millions of euros against those that violate its privacy and security standards (Wolford, 2018). The law's foundations are based upon the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights, which states that all people have the "right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" (European Court of Human Rights, 1950).

Similarly to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, the GDPR outlines seven protection and accountability principles: lawfulness fairness and transparency, purpose limitation, data minimization, accuracy, storage limitation, integrity and confidentiality, and accountability (GDPR.eu, 2019). Data that is processed must be used for the explicitly stated purpose of collection, must be accurate and up to date and may only be stored for as long as necessary for the specified purpose. Processing personal information must ensure security, integrity, and private technology companies or entities must demonstrate compliance with all principles of the GDPR.

Data security is handled by implementing "appropriate technical and organizational measures," which can include two-factor authentication for accounts with stored personal data and contracting with cloud providers that use end-to-end encryption.

Under the GDPR, processing personal data is legal, but only if the individual grants specific and unambiguous consent to processing the data (such as opting into a marketing email list), entering into a contract, a background check, a legal obligation required by a court, performing a task in the public interest, or when there is a "legitimate interest" that is not overridden by an individual's "fundamental rights and freedoms" (GDPR.eu, 2018).

Data subjects can always withdraw previously given consent, in which the decision must be honored, and children under the age of 13 may only give consent with parental permission. Since its passage in 2015, the GDPR has also prompted companies in the United States to embrace more privacy-

friendly practices. Amazon has promised to strengthen encryption around its stored data from cloud storage services and give customers the right to choose which region they would like their data to be stored (Amazon Web Services, 2018).

While the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights may prove to be more adaptable to evolving technology such as artificial intelligence, which may require aggregate masses of data for machine learning or smart infrastructure than the rigid GDPR, ultimately both the draft and law create strong foundations for a more secure and transparent Internet where users can feel safer and more confident in how their personal information is gathered and processed, if at all.

New data privacy regulations are in the works or being implemented rapidly in the United States. In 2018, the State of California passed the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), which secured new privacy rights for its consumers, including "The right to know about the personal information a business collects about them and how it is used and shared; The right to delete personal information collected from them (with some exceptions); The right to opt-out of the sale of their personal information; and The right to non-discrimination for exercising their CCPA rights" (California Consumer Privacy Act, 2018). Businesses are required to disclose the personal information they collect on consumers, including the purposes for which it is to be used, the categories of third parties with whom the business shares the personal information, and the categories of information that the business sells or discloses to third parties. While there are more exceptions in the CCPA that allow for businesses to retain an individual's personal information, one may still request to have it deleted by the business and for it to tell its service providers to do the same.

The right to privacy, as Mark Alfino and Randolph Mayes of the Florida State University Department of Philosophy explain, is a fundamental moral right that must be upheld in order to uphold personal autonomy and liberty (Alfino & Mayes, 2003). With respect to informational privacy and the "right to be left alone," there are currently many barriers preventing individuals from accessing this right in the online sphere, as private technology companies continue to routinely abuse the lack of regulations of data privacy to profit by selling personal information for targeted advertising or other third parties. While some individuals may be willing to share their personal information with private technology companies, it is crucial that they are fully aware of the implications and precise details of what they are sharing, and these companies must take on the role of a "fiduciary," or prioritizing a client's interests over its own. There are already steps being taken to secure this right for individuals as seen by the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, GDPR, and CCPA, but it is important to understand how we arrived at this situation in the first place. Only when legislation supported by the highest levels of the judicial system is passed, is void of loopholes and

shortcomings, and holds private technology companies or entities accountable for their actions can people finally begin to take back control of their right to information privacy.

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